一、中翻英
改编自《小木头爱昆曲》 郑培凯,给了全文,总共要求翻译划线部分的三段。
①小木头(Littlewood)是我们给他的昵称,他真正的名衔是威廉·李特尔伍德(直接给了英文William
Littlewood)教授,英国人,剑桥大学毕业,在香港生活了近半辈子,(改编:年逾花甲,却依然神采飞扬,还写了好几本专著),是英语教学领域备受尊重的大人物。(改编:同为教授的我与他先前就已经认识,不过只是点头之交,后来由于机缘巧合,我们竟然成为了好朋友,不是因为英语教学上的切磋,也不是因为对比较文学的学术交流兴趣,而是因为对于观赏昆曲的狂热和痴迷)(回忆版本略有出入,大意相同)
②看完戏,他还不走,跟着一批粉丝围着演员拍照。大家都觉得这位满头白发的洋老头挺有趣,簇拥他上了舞台,跟尚未卸妆的演员站在一道,让台下的粉丝咔嚓咔嚓,增添了昆曲国际化的铁证。戏曲界有句谚语,“唱戏的是疯子,看戏的是傻子”。小木头站在红氍毹上,乐呵呵的,当然不是疯子,但乐在其中,有点傻乎乎的。这样看来,小木头可以臻于顶级戏迷之列了。
(第③段全段改编)③梁漱溟认为,不管是唱戏的疯子和看戏的傻子,他们都已经臻于化境,可以比之圣人,他们已经与天地宇宙融为一体,有着民胞物与的仁者之心。我觉得,这对戏迷们来说可是醍醐灌顶,精神境界也得到了升华。我认为,小木头为人谦恭、与世无争,称得上当之无愧的仁者。
二、英译中(不是单纯的英译中,陷阱重重,变态至极)有两个要求:
①通读文章(共437词),根据作者的行文逻辑,用中文画出思维导图;
②根据你的理解,将文章译述(还特地加粗了译述这两个字,强调并不是逐字翻译,还是类似于改写,而且逐字翻译的话500字也肯定不够)出来,要求是500字左右。
文章选自MEDICAL ETHICS by
William Ruddick
原文网址
https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/philosophy/documents/faculty-documents/ruddick/medethics.html
摘了以下这几段(几乎是一模一样,可能有一点点的改编):
Medical centers are a primary
context for medicalethics, as well as medical care. Whether physicians,
philosophers, or theologians,most medical ethicists are primarily based in
medical schools and teachinghospitals, and their principal audiences are (apart
from one another) medicalstudents and residents. This setting partially
explains the primary role ofactual case analysis in medical ethics, by contrast
with much ethical writing.Physicians and nurses have little patience with the
theoretical dialectic orfanciful test-cases that constitute much current
secular ethics.
Nor do they readily accept the
main theoreticalalternatives. The Kantian ideal of persons as rational
ends-in-themselves ishard to reconcile with the reality of patients whose
mature judgment, sense ofself and self-interests, and dignity are subverted by
illness. Likewise, thescope of the Hippocratic maxim, "Strive to help but
above all, do noharm" is far narrower than the Utilitarian principle, "Everyonecounts
for one and no more than one." Some physicians will give someweight to the
welfare of a patient's family, hospital staff, or future patients(e.g. in drug
trials unlikely to benefit current patients), but they willalmost certainly
ignore the friends, heirs or employers who may be seriouslyaffected by
treatment decisions.
In the light of practitioners'
resistance, somemedical ethicists have forsaken ethical theories that have a
single, dominantprinciple in favor of the jurist’s tactic of
"balancing" severalunranked principles. Decisions are to be reached
by "weighing" foreach case the now canonical principles of autonomy,
beneficence, and non-maleficence,and, when appropriate, veracity, sanctity of
life, and distributive justice.
Critics find this procedure
too dependent onindividual intuition, and have proposed various remedies. On
one proposal,conflicting general principles are "specified" to yield
compatiblenorms for a specific case. On another, the general principles are
supplementedor replaced by a larger number of prohibitions drawn from
"commonsense" morality. On a "bottom up" alternative drawn
fromMedieval casuistry, it is richly described paradigm cases, not principles,
thathave the central role in moral reasoning. Other proposals would dispense
withprinciples altogether in favor of professional virtues (integrity,
fiduciaryresponsibility, compassion); the central concerns of "care
ethics"(response to need, dependency, trust); and/or
"narratives"sensitively constructed from conversations with patients,
families, and otherattendants.
All of these approaches have
theoretical aspectsand arguments, but the less the explicit appeal to carefully
formulated andsupported moral principles, the less that special philosophical
training mayseem necessary for case analysis. Philosophers, of course, pride
themselves ontheir clarity, sense of relevance, and stock of apt questions and
distinctions,but so too do lawyers. Moreover, medical ethicists liberally
borrow notions andcases from the law (due care, act/omission, competence;
Quinlan, Cruzan, BabyDoes, Joyce Brown). There are, however, differences due as
much to training asto institutional positions: philosophers give less weight
than do "legalrisk managers" to institutional interests in deciding
contentious cases orformulating policy. On the other hand, medical ethicists
may give more weightto institutional interests and physician practices than
those bioethicistswhose concerns are general issues of the creating, saving,
and taking of life,with or without physicians’ assistance.
The content and methods of
medical ethics teachingvaries with audience and locale. In philosophy
department classes, cases areused to raise general, often abstract issues of
moral reasoning and moraltheory, the definition of central concepts (autonomy,
death, causalconnection), and metaphysical presuppositions (personal identify,
body-mindrelations). In most medical schools, there is little appetite for such
abstractmatters, and too little curricular time to convince students and
clinicalco-teachers of their relevance to the pressing clinical issues and
cases athand. We should not be surprised there is no Socratic dialogue
withHippocrates.